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Abstract
Exorbitant executive compensation packages have drawn large criticism from the
public eye and with the recent financial crisis and the previous tech bubble opinion on
executive incentives has forced government institutions to respond. Over the past two
decades the SEC and FASB have aimed to respond to the public and with three large
regulation changes in the 2000s, pay for performance compensation has gone through
many changes. In this study I build on previous work in an attempt to answer whether or
not executives within the Information Technology industry have seen a larger decline in
option compensation when compared to executives outside of the industry. Previous
studies have indicated that option use has been consistently higher in the IT industry and
in addition another study has showed that option use across all companies has decreased
dramatically due to regulation changes. In this study I find that option use has
dramatically decreased over the past decade due to regulation and that option use in the
IT industry has remained consistently higher than others. I find that there is little
significant evidence suggesting regulation changes have affected the IT industry at a
larger rate than others. I would argue that the industry is less sensitive to regulation
changes regarding option use but I do find significant evidence that the industry has seen
larger decreases in option use in 2013 when compared to other industries.
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I. Introduction
When selecting compensation strategies for top executives a company uses a
portfolio of company assets in creating a compensation package for their executives. The
total value of the assets in these packages vary based on what kind resources are used as
well as their fair market value at the time. These portfolios generally consist of a variety
of assets, including Cash, Stock Options, Retirement Packages, Inside Debt and other
Long-Term Incentive Plans (LTIPS) (Investopedia.com). The company uses all these
payment types in an effort to encourage high performance. Since these assets are affected
by market prices a company encourages performance by tying the value of company
prices to compensation value. This pay for performance strategy incentivizes top
executives to increase performance and help build value at the firm company. For
example, stock options are more valuable when a company has a high stock price, this
would mean any executive who is compensated with company stock would be
encourages to increase company stock performance and subsequently raise his own
compensation value. Other types of assets such as Cash payments are not a type of pay
for performance instrument but are instead in compensation packages as a preventative
measure against executives who might be making high risk decisions in hopes of
increasing compensation value.
In 1992 the average CEO of an S&P500 firm earned $2.7 million in compensation
and by 2000 the average pay had increased to over $14 million in compensation. This
meant that CEOs were being paid 82 times the earning of an average worker and by 2005
CEOs were being paid 369 times the earning amount of an average worker. Under the
accounting guidelines at the time companies did not have to incur an accounting charge
1|Page

for options, and other payment methods, on their financial statements (Gine 2007 &
Anderson, Banker and Ravindran 2000).

1

In the graph above we can see that the mean of CFO and CEO executive
compensation reached an all time high in 2000 and was drastically increasing in the nine
years prior. The average compensation these executives were receiving was larger than
$3 million in 2000 and has now reached the same level once again in 2014. Even with
these expansive compensation packages, salary payments to CEOs and CFOs were
miniscule compared to other compensation methods.
It is safe to say that these exorbitant payments were met with large opposition in
the public eye. In the modern day where data is shared through a large amount of
This graph and all others were created using Execucomp Data from the years 1992 – 2014. The data was
limited to only CEO and CFO compensation. The graph represents the mean of total compensation and the
mean of cash compensation of these two executives during the past 22 years. Specific data summaries will
be provided later in this paper.
1
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mediums the average worker can easily find the amounts CEOs and other executives are
paid. Public opinion became so influential companies started to adjust their structure of
executive compensation packages in response to the outlash. Even the largest of
companies succumbed to this pressure; in 2009 Goldman Sachs acknowledged that public
anger about high executive compensation constrained the pay of its top five executives
(Kuhnen 2012). The Dot-Com bubble and the recent financial crisis have brought light to
exorbitant compensation packages and public opinion has begun to harshly criticize
companies for their large pay regardless of executive performance.
"...The truth is that boards of directors and compensation
committees have adopted the modern standard of behavior: What's
acceptable is what you can get away with. The executive-pay
system is rigged. It has become an incestuous daisy chain of
mutual greed and payoffs. Whether executives perform well or
poorly, they rake in the riches. Heads they win, tails they win. For
every executive who truly deserves his millions, a hundred others
are ripping off their companies and shareholders..."(Gilmor 1997)
Government involvement in this issue has increased over the past two decades.
Several measures such as the Dodd Frank Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as well as
several accounting standards have been passed over this time frame in an attempt to
increase visibility of just how much executives are making. The Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) passed one of these measures in 2004 and required companies
to expense equity based compensation and reflect it in the financial statements based on
the fair value of the awarded assets (Gine 2007 and FASB 2004). FAS 123 (r), as the
standard is codified, also required all compensation information to be reported, under
DEF14A, in 6 new tables, which covered everything from a summary of compensation to
any outstanding awards. By responding to the public and creating these new guidelines

3|Page

the SEC and FASB have helped increase the visibility of compensation over recent years
and brought to light the true extent of pay for performance methods. But have these
regulations affected certain industries more than others? Have the new accounting
regulations of expensing these awards made it hard for capital-intensive industries to
continue using stock options as well as other pay for performance methods?

A. Executive Compensation in Technology
One industry in particular has been known to use stock options as well as other
pay for performance methods more than any other, the information technology industry.
Focused largely in Silicon Valley the IT industry has revolved all compensation around
stock options and has been known to do so for quite some time. “From Intel in the 1960s
to Apple in the 1970s to Silicon Graphics in the 1980s to Netscape and a host of others in
the 1990s, enough Silicon Valley companies have delivered enough stock option jackpots
to enough employees to create an entirely new business culture” (Fox 1997). Culture in
Silicon Valley is very important to success in the industry and in this study we will assess
whether companies in the area have seen a larger amount of change due to the recent
regulation changes than others. There are two large incentives for tech companies to use
forms of payment aside from cash. The first incentive is the greater retention they can
create with stock and the second is to keep cash on hand. In the IT industry stock options
are even used in compensating entry-level employees, especially in startups where the
cost to compensate in cash is much higher due to increased competitiveness with mature
companies.
The motivation behind this paper is to assess whether the aforementioned
regulation changes have had a larger negative impact on companies within the
4|Page

Information Technology industry as a whole when compared to other industries. By
formulating a regression that factors in variables associated with option use I will able to
quantify the changes regulation have had on option use and I will also be able to identify
the differences in option use between the IT industry and companies outside of it.
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II. Literature Review
In this section I will cover the respective regulations that have been passed within
the previous two decades as well as their possible effects on compensation within various
industries. I will also cover previous literature that pertains to the matter of executive
compensation as well as previous works that pertain to compensation within the
technology industry. Finally, I will conclude with any works that pertain to variable
choices and common practices in which compensation is valued and assessed. Most
research in this area delves into the specific compensation forms but does not cover the
changes across specific industries nor does it cover as long of a time period as this study.
The increased visibility of executive compensation in recent years and the new regulatory
changes have affected company reporting, expensing, and compensating behavior and
social issues along with recent crises have led to an increase in the discussion about
executive compensation in recent years.
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A. Regulation
In the past two decades we have seen three large reforms, which changed the
transparency of compensation in addition to changing company incentives regarding the
various forms of compensation awards. In this section I will cover these three different
regulations, their history, their specific requirements and their realized effects as well as
any possible effects they may have had.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The first of these regulations is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and is commonly known
as SOX. Signed into law by President Bush in 2002, this piece of regulation was intended
to control the conditions and cultural influences that lead to multiple fraudulent business
practices in the year 2000-2002. The fall of Enron, WorldCom and Tyco uncovered the
large internal conflicts companies faced as well as the compensation methods that
encouraged executives into riskier business practices (Farrell 2007). Although the Act did
little to impact executive compensation transparency directly, the act did contain one
strong provision which had the potential to have a large impact on compensation
practices. Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act gave the SEC unprecedented power
over compensation. The specifics of the section and the specific regulation is as follows:
“If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the material
noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any financial reporting
requirement under the securities laws, the chief executive officer and chief financial
officer of the issuer shall reimburse the issuer for –
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(1) any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation received
by that person from the issuer during the 12-month period following the
first public issuance or filing with the Commission (whichever occurs) of
the financial document embodying such financial reporting requirement;
and
(2) any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during that 12month period.”(SOXCPA 2009).
As we can see from the above cases, this section of that act clearly gives the SEC
the power to control executive compensation and even force the forfeiture of
bonuses and profits that any CEO or CFO has received within a given year if
fraudulent business practices are exposed. Unfortunately the act may not be
perceived as being effective. The first instance of the section’s use was in 2007
and up until December of 2013 the section has only been used 31 times
(Morgenson 2013). Much of this can be attributed to the threat these clawbacks
have posed to the executives. The time as well as monetarily consuming litigation
have forced companies to tighten on their reporting and has led to a decrease in
the financial errors in reporting and a fall in financial restatements since its
passing (Morgenson 2013). For the purpose of this study we should not expect a
large change in compensation value or any component value of compensation
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packages in the year of 2002 or any the following years whether we are focusing
on the IT industry or outside of it.2
FAS123(R)
In 2005, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), under pressure from
the SEC, modified FAS123, a standard that previously required disclosure of stock option
positions but did not require any income statement expensing. FASB revised FAS123 to
require the expensing of stock options when granted. The expensing of these options
under rule FAS123(R) is required and is to be prepared “using a fair-value-based method
that is similar in most respects to the fair-value-based method established in Statement
123” (FASB 2004). The fair-value based rule that was established in FAS123(R) has now
changed to require all companies to use the Black-Scholes Method of stock option
valuation to determine expense costs (FASB 2004).
This new rule implemented by the FASB has the largest realizable change of the
three regulations mentioned in this section. Expensing of compensation outside Salary
has not been required up until 2004. This meant that one of the largest sections of total
compensation was left out. I predict that the largest change in compensation, specifically
stock option compensation, will come in the year following this accounting change. The
expensing of options will incentivize companies to reduce this form of compensation in
order to keep a larger share of income.
A study conducted in 2012 by Hayes Lemmon and Qiu (2010) observed “firms
dramatically reduce their usage of stock options after the adoption of FAS123R and that
2

This study uses dummies in years following regulation changes in order to assess the affects these laws
have had in the following year. This law does not directly impact option share use, regardless of industry,
and does not have any significant results to compensation change.
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the decline in option use is strongly associated with a proxy for accounting costs.”3 In this
study we will observe these changes on the IT industry and specifically whether the usage
of stock options has decreased more than other industries.
Dodd-Frank Act
The last of these regulatory changes is the Dodd Frank Act, which was passed in
2010. Included in the act are five sections, which required more oversight on executive
compensation and shareholder acknowledgment of compensation. The sections are as
follows:


Section 951: Requires advisory votes of shareholders about executive
compensation and parachutes. Also requires institutional investment managers to
report their voting on advisory shareholder votes.



Section 952: Requires disclosure about the role of, and potential conflicts
involving, compensation consultants. This statute also requires the Commission to
direct that the exchanges adopt listing standards that include certain enhanced
independence requirements for members of issuers’ compensation committees.
The Commission is also directed to establish competitively neutral independence
factors for all who are retained to advise compensation committees.



Section 953: Requires additional disclosure about certain compensation matters,
including pay-for-performance and the ratio between the CEO’s total
compensation and the median total compensation for all other company
employees.

3

A second component of this study was to observe FAS123R affects on risky investment practices and
found no significant results.
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Section 954: Requires the Commission to direct the exchanges to prohibit the
listing of securities of issuers that have not developed and implemented
compensation claw-back policies.



Section 955: Requires additional disclosure about whether directors and
employees are permitted to hedge any decrease in market value of the company’s
stock (SEC 2015).

Over the course of five years the SEC has gradually voted on these sections and within
the past few years only a few have been signed into law. There are two reasons we should
expect this new act to have an insignificant affect on executive compensation in recent
years. The first of these reasons is due to the directness of the act towards the financial
industry. Taking place right after the financial crisis these rules were created to target
large financial institutions and help increase transparency within the organizations.
Secondly, the recent changes in regulation have not all been in effect during our data
range. Ending at 2014, Execucomp data will be unable to capture how all of these
changes have affected compensation with the exception of the first two sections, which
pertain to disclosure. Section 951 and 952 of the act are the only sections of the five
which have been adopted by the SEC. Section 951 was adopted in January of 2011 and
Section 952 was adopted in June of 2012 (SEC 2015). I do not predict that the value of
options awarded to executives will change in the final year of our study due to the limited
number of sections in implementation at the time of this study. In addition the increasing
disclosures and transparency of compensation does not have a direct affect on
compensation incentives as the previous two regulations mentioned.
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B. “Executive Compensation in the Information Technology Industry“
Written by Mark C. Anderson, Rajiv D. Banker, and Sury Ravindran, this paper is
the only recent analysis of executive compensation, and in specific, compensation within
the information technology industry. Conducted in 2000 this study takes a look at the
aggressive use of employee stock options in Silicon Valley. This is the only paper which
analyzes and develops a regression which differentiates between the use of compensation
in the IT industry and outside of it. The study indicated executives at IT firms “received a
greater portion of their total compensation in the form of stock options” even after
controlling for economic factors. The regression used in this study takes into account
many of the economic factors as well as local company factors in determining the effect
IT culture has on option compensation (Anderson, Banker and Ravindran 2000).
However, the paper does not suggest or analyze any changes in compensation
throughout specific time periods. Although the paper used Execucomp data, only four
years of data (1992-1996) was used in the study and no time variable was accounted for.
In my analysis I will use a similar regression as in this paper but will focus on time trends
as well as focusing on changes within specific years due to the regulation introductions.
Company size is also a determining factor when it comes to sensitivity on compensation
and in my analysis I will differentiate companies based on their market value.4

C. Compensation Regulation
Previous studies have observed the affect regulation has had on compensation. In
1992 the SEC and Congress passed legislation under the Internal Revenue Code Section
4

All variables mentioned in this study and used in regression analysis can be found in Table 2 along with
their descriptions
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162(m), which required disclosure of compensation levels for top executives. Analysis
showed that increased transparency helped reduce compensation growth rates and even
reduced compensation in some companies (Perry and Zenner 2001). In addition to this
disclosure, Congress deemed any “pay above $1 million that is not tied to performance
[to be] deemed ‘excessive’ and [not] eligible to be deducted from corporate income for
tax purposes”(Dew-Becker 2009). An even larger change occurred in 2006 when the SEC
required all companies to disclose all forms of compensation (Dew-Becker 2009). These
regulations show that companies respond significantly to regulation changes and as a
whole tend to adjust compensation based on the incentive changes. As mentioned earlier
Hayes Lemmon and Qiu (2010) observed drastic changes to compensation packages
following regulation changes. In my study the goal is to differentiate these regulation
change effects on the IT industry.

D. Performance Based Compensation
Over the years many scholars have addressed and attempted to explain the
theories behind compensation and specifically the relation between performance and the
payoff executives should receive. Holmstrom (1979) stated that there “has long been
recognized that a problem of moral hazard may arise when individuals engage in risk
sharing under conditions such that their privately taken actions affect the probability
distribution of the outcome.” Holmstrom (1979) argues that this “moral hazard” is solved
over time when the availability of information allows principals to renegotiate contracts
information asymmetry is reduced. However, in order to compensate for issues
surrounding asymmetric information firms choose to tie current and future performance
to compensation of managers in order to incentivize strong performance and attract
13 | P a g e

managers with similar objectives (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). Not only do these
studies relate pay to performance, they also relate performance to pay. Boschen and
Smith argue that the performance of a company relies heavily on the pay managers
receive as pay is directly correlated with the firm’s expectation of the manager’s ability,
thus the higher the pay the more experienced and successful the manager is likely to be
(Boschen and Smith 1995). In this study I will not take a look into pay for performance
metrics or incentives. Instead, I will focus solely on the effects these regulation changes
have had on compensation.
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III. Methodology & Theory
In this section my primary objective is to outline a framework that will allow me
to investigate time differences in the value and components of executive compensation
and more specifically between IT firms and other firms. By identifying the key drivers
that affect option use I can regress a model that will correctly identify the correlation
between time and industry location in the effect of option use.

A. Endogenous Variable
The primary objective of this study is to observe the change in use of alternative
forms of compensation over the past 22 years and determine whether regulation has had a
large effect on firm use of options and bonuses in compensation packages to CEOs and
CFOs in the Information Technology industry. OptionShare5 is the specific endogenous
variable we will observe in the analysis.

5

The description for calculation of Option Share is found in Table 2
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I will try to understand how time has played a role in the use of options as well as
determining which regulations had the largest affect and whether or not option use was
affected in the IT industry at a greater rate than others. As you can see above, the average
amount of OptionShare as a percentage of total compensation is over 10% larger for
executives within the Information Technology industry vs. those outside of the industry.
A general trend can be observed within OptionShare data by taking a look at the changes
this in this variable over time.

The graph above depicts the trend OptionShares have followed over the past 22
years. It is clear the firms in the IT industry have always been more aggressive in the use
of this form of compensation in their packages, however it is intriguing to note that
within the past five years the mean OptionShare within the industry has fallen at a
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greater rate than that of other industries and the difference is very small in the year 2014.
If we look at the respective means of the IT and non-IT industries we find that on average
the OptionShare for an executive in the IT industry is over 10% higher than in non-IT
industries (32.75% vs. 21.82%).6 If we take a look at median OptionShare the story is
the same, with executives in the IT industry earning more than 24% of their
compensation through options vs. 14.46% for non-IT executives. In 2014 option share in
IT companies was less than 2% more than non-IT companies (13.35% vs. 11.55%). Both
mean and median differences for OptionShare are significant under a P-value evaluation
of under .05. This falls in line with my hypothesis that the IT industry has been affected
by the changing regulations at a larger amount than other industries in North America.
We can see that in the year 2006, following the passing of the revised law of FAS 123R
option use within the IT industry continued to fall for the following three years while the
use of options in other industries seems to be marginally decreasing over the same time
period.

B. Economic Factors
In order to correctly account for OptionShare correlation in the regression I will
also need to factor in economic factors that have played a role in compensation levels
over time. Generally compensation is based on company performance and to account for
this performance I will identify three variables, which can be used to account and proxy
for economic factors that influence option use as well as value. These three proxies will

You can find specific mean and median averages, as well as p-value calculations for all variables spoken
about in this section on Table 5
6

17 | P a g e

account for changes in growth opportunities as well as the different objective timelines
that companies focus on.
The first of these variables is the Book-to-Market ratio. The Book-to-Market
ratio is used in multiple previous studies to represent the number growth opportunities a
firm has (Gaver and Gaver 1993). Essentially a company that has more growth
opportunities will trade at a higher market value than the book value of the assets in the
company. Companies will trade at a larger excess over book value if the investment
opportunities of the firm are larger (Myers 1997). In addition this variable will also take
into account the effect of debt riskiness in company strategy (Myers 1977). The book to
market ratios between IT firms and non-IT firms are fairly similar as we can see in Table
6. On average IT companies have a slightly higher mean but this does not fall under a
significant difference in a p-value calculation. In addition, upon calculating the median

Book-to-Market ratios we find that non-IT firms have a slightly higher median but it is
also not indicative of any true difference between industries.
The second factor which affects compensation is company performance and in
this study I will compensate for this correlation using Return on stock price as well as a

Lagged Return variable. As done by Anderson, Banker and Ravindran (2000) a lagged
Return variable is used because a portion of compensation is dependent on previous year
performance in addition to current year performance (Murphy 1985). In primary
observations we can see that the difference in mean values of Return and Lagged Return
between IT and non-IT industries is insignificant and due to large outlier influences it is
more reasonable to compare median observations. Looking at our median values we can
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see that the non-IT industries have a slightly higher Return as well as Lagged Return
when compared to IT companies.
Finally the dividend rate can be used to account for economic factors. Companies
which do not payout dividends are likely to reinvest the income for future growth
opportunities while companies that do not have many opportunities are more likely to pay
dividends to shareholders (Gaver and Gaver 1995). These three variables will compensate
for any growth factors, which play a role in use of compensation components as well as
compensation component values (Anderson, Banker and Ravindran 2000). From Table 6
we can see that companies in the IT industry, on average, pay fewer dividends to
shareholders and this falls in line with the hypothesis that IT companies tend to pay fewer
dividends because of greater investment opportunities.

C. Age
Age is a variable that can be used as a proxy for multiple factors. First of all age
can provide companies with information pertaining to executive ability (Murphy 1986).
In addition to more experience, a manager with a longer track record will reduce
information asymmetry regardless of whether previous performance was positive or
negative. Information about compensation expectations will also be clearer with older
executives. CEOs with more experience in their career are more likely to demand higher
compensation than younger CEOs. In addition to increased information, executives who
are younger will more likely focus on long-term objectives due to their age, while older
executives may be less concerned about long-term performance as they get closer to
retirement (Anderson, Banker and Ravindran 2000). As we can see form the graph below
it seems that non-IT executives have generally been slightly older than IT executives but
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the difference has become smaller over the past decade. The average as well as median
age of IT executives is 52 years, four years younger than the average Non-IT executive.
The p-value for test of difference indicated that the difference is significant.

D. Volatility
Volatility has played a role in compensation structure due to the increased
riskiness of option value changes. Executives would rather be compensated with larger
cash or salary portions if the volatility of company stock can greatly influence the value
of options. With this increased risk in stock executives will negotiate for other forms of
compensation. On the other hand, it is possible that companies will grant executives with
more options in order to compensate for higher volatility in option value.
As well as a representation of risk in value changes, volatility can also be used as
a proxy for innovation or growth opportunities within a company. Previous research has
20 | P a g e

showed that companies with long-term objectives and risky projects favor central
ownership rather than outside ownership of stock (Francis and Smith 1995). In the IT
industry companies are more volatile when comparing both means and medians to non-IT
companies, in addition the difference is significant when using a p-value calculation.

E. Ownership & Structure
The amount of stock an executive receives in compensation may affect incentives
if stock ownership represents a large amount of outstanding stock. Stock ownership can
have two effects, the first of which is a convergence of interests. If an executive’s wealth
is composed of a majority of stock it would be inefficient to reward this executive with
more stock compensation in order to boost performance incentives (Anderson, Banker
and Ravindran 2000). Awarding these executives with too much stock will reduce the
effect that performance incentives provide. Entrenchment can occur when an executive
owns a larger amount of outstanding stock when compared to other shareholders. Owning
such high levels of outstanding stock “insulates the manager from market discipline,
which may lead to greater personal consumption of firm resources (higher total pay) and
suboptimal decision making (lower firm performance) “(Anderson, Banker and
Ravindran 2000). As done by (Anderson, Banker and Ravindran (2000) I also define two
variables, which account for executive holdings of outstanding stock in forms of options
as well as stock. I compare stock held to total pay as well as firm equity and in addition I
compare options held to total pay as well as firm equity.
In the graph below we can see that IT company executives have held a higher
percentage of Shares Outstanding than their non-IT counterparts. However the difference
has decreased throughout the past 19 years and the difference between these executives
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has become much smaller, specifically within the past six years. In Table 6 we can find
all four of the variables mentioned in the previous paragraph as well as their respective
mean and medians. Observing the p-value for test of difference we find all of the
variables to be significantly differentiated except for Options Held/Firm Equity, which
is just slightly above the significance boundary of 0.05.

The company’s structure will also influence the level of incentive based pay an
executive will receive in compensation. Debt to Assets has been suggested to affect
incentive based compensation depending on how a company is structured. Companies
with larger debt would often prefer less risky projects and will appropriately compensate
executives with less stock based income (John and John 1993). Other researchers have
conflicted on the issue, Garvey and Mawani (1999) found that stock options may be used
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to reduce incentivizing risky projects when debt levels are high but found that there was
“no evidence that risk-taking incentives are increased by financial leverage.”

F. Size
Size will reflect the compensation structure as well. Larger companies will often
hire more experienced executives while smaller ones will hire younger ones and in turn
pay smaller compensation packages. Controlling for company size will reduce the affect
of company incentives on executive pay has on our independent variable. In addition to
differing experience in CEOs and CFOs, smaller companies will often use other forms of
compensation aside from salaries and bonuses due to capital constraints. In this study
company size will be adjusted for by using the Market Value.
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G. Time
I will introduce four times variables in this study. First of which will be a time
trend variable that will cover all 22 years of this study. The final three will consist of
dummy variables for each year following one of the regulation changes mentioned.
Dummies for the years 2006 and 2013 will show the direct change of regulation on the
subsequent year’s compensation structures. In Table 3 you can find a summary of the
variables, which quantify the time changes, and the aforementioned dummy variables and
in addition interaction terms between these variables and the IT industry dummy.
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IV. Data and Empirical Results
In this section I will briefly describe the dataset and the steps taken to compile
and create the set to be used in the regression. I will also talk about some of the
descriptive information and the variables used in the study as well as the regression and
their purpose. Finally I will conclude with the regression results and the outcomes of the
study.

A. Data
Using the Execucomp data set, as well as the annual company data from
Compustat, I was able to compile a dataset that would allow me to analyze the changing
use of compensation over the past two decades. Execucomp compiles compensation on
executives at companies within the S&P 1500. The dataset starts at the year 1992 and
covers over two decades of compensation data until 2014. Compustat compiles company
data from balance sheet to financial statement to cash flow details and provides an annual
summary for North American companies both public and private. Using Excel and Stata I
was able to import annual data from the Compustat database and integrate it into the
Execucomp data set over 3,300 company compensation data. Included in the Execucomp
data set are the respective Standard&Poor’s Industry Codes and descriptions. I used these
industry codes to separate the data by industry and identify the specific industries that
contained information technology companies. Table 1 covers the four industries as well
as their respective subsections as well as listing the respective S&P Industry codes.
Narrowing down this data set was particularly important in order to see trends among top
executives. I chose to only focus on CEO and CFO data in this study. Unfortunately
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during the data gathering process some of the variables defined in the previous section
limited the observable range of the study. The regressions in the following sections will
focus on the years 2005-2014.
Using this dataset I created multiple time and industry dummies to help analyze
the data. Specifically I introduced a time trend variable, which depends on which year
observations occurred. This time trend variable will help show the overall effect each
year has had on the compensation methods. In addition I added dummies for years
following regulation changes.

B. Descriptive Information
Table 6 provides an overall outlook of all the variables discussed in the previous
section as well as providing mean and median values for each variable. The table also
features a P-value test of difference that identifies the variables with significantly
different means between IT executives and non-IT executives. Due to the lack of data
regarding dividend payouts a limited regression would have to be run and in order to
observe a greater sample of compensation data I chose to drop the dividend rate from the
regression. Using a four-step model allowed me to compare effects across time and with
interaction terms I was able to identify the specific industrial affect over time as well as
affects due to the three regulation changes. In the preliminary preparation for this study
data was to be used from 1992 until 2014 but due to the nature of data collection a period
of ten years was used instead (2005-2014). This data range will still allow me to account
for the largest regulation change, FAS123R, and still provides a large amount of
observations to appropriately provide insight into the last decade of change within
compensation.
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C. Results
A table of the four models used and mentioned in the previous section can be
found in Table 7 after the Bibliography. For the purpose of conciseness in this section I
will summarize the first regression using the term, Original117 to refer to the variables
used in all 4 of the models. I will go over my findings by differentiating between the four
models and by summarizing the differences between them.

Model 1
The first equation is shown below. Model 1 is meant to show the overall trend that
option use has gone through over the past 10 years across all the companies in the study
and provide a basis for comparison with the next three models with.
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 = ∝ + 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙11 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝜀𝑗

OptionShare, as defined in Table 2, is the percentage of total compensation that an
executive receives in the form of a stock option payment. As mentioned at the start of this
section the Original11 refers to the eleven variables defined in the Methodology and
Theory section, excluding the dividend rate as explained above.
Focusing on the first eleven variables we see that there are eight significant
variables. Return was significant at a 5% level however it indicated that for every one
percent increase in current company stock price an executive would receive a 0.0047%
decrease in OptionShare. Lagged Return was also significant but the correlation
coefficient was miniscule and did not have any large effect on OptionShare. For every
1% increase in Volatility, on average, OptionShare increases by 0.032% and the
7

The original eleven variables are Book-To-Market, Return, LReturn, Age, Volatility, Stock Held/Total
Pay, Stock Held/Firm Equity, Options Held/Total Pay, Options Held/Firm Equity, Debt to Assets and
finally Market Size.
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correlation is significant at the 5% level. All but one of the four variables used to account
for ownership were deemed to be significant at the 1% level, however Options Held/

Firm Equity was not significant at any level. This falls in line with the previous study
performed by Anderson, Banker and Ravindran. Stock Held / Firm Equity had the
largest effect on Option use with a 1% increase leading to a .277% increase in

OptionShare. Debt to Assets was also significant at the 1% level, demonstrating a
0.065% decrease in OptionShare for every 1% increase in the ratio.
Focusing on the Time Trend variable I observe that since 1992 the companies in
the study have decreased OptionShare by 0.6277 every year. This means that over the 10
year period of this study the percentage of options being used within compensation
packages decreased by 6.277%. In the following section I will discuss the findings of
Model 2 which accounts for periods following regulation changes.

Model 2
In this model two dummy variables were introduced for the years 2006, and 2013
as follows:
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 = ∝ + 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙11 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝑑2006 + 𝑑2013 + 𝜀𝑗
Following the introduction of these variables there was no significant change within the
correlations of the Original11 variables in the study. Moving on to the dummy variables
we find that after the revision of FAS123 revision OptionShare decreased by -4.619%
which falls in line with the previous study done by Hayes, Lemmon and Qiu. Taking into
account the year 2013 we see that OptionShare across all the companies within the study
rose by 0.745% however this result is not significant at the 5% level. The Time Trend
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which was introduced in the first model was still significant at the 1% level and the
correlation increased after accounting for the two years with the introduction of the
dummy variables. Time Trend is now associated with a yearly decrease in OptionShare
of 0.794 percent or 7.94 percent decrease over the time period of this study. It is clear that
within the companies of this study option use as a form of compensation has decreased
dramatically over the past decade when accounting for the variables defined in
Methodology and Theory and that FAS123R had a large affect while any introductions
from the Dodd Frank Act did not seem to provide any deterrent to option use.

Model 3
In this regression Model 1 was used and the Time Trend variable was replaced
with an interaction variable composed of the Time Trend variable and a dummy for IT
companies. This variable allows for the observation of an average yearly OptionShare
change in companies within the Information Technology Industry.
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 = ∝ + 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙11 + (𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 ∗ 𝑑𝐼𝑇) + 𝜀𝑗
There were no significant changes in the Original11 variables results aside from a
decrease in the significance of volatility which saw it fall outside the 5% level. The
association of Stock Held/Firm Equity with OptionShare increased slightly from
0.277% to 0.308% for each 1% increase in the variable. The new interaction of Time

Trend and dIT showed that over the ten year period companies within the IT industry
increased their option use by a yearly average of 0.205%, after accounting for other
factors which affect option use. This indicates that over the period IT industries did not
suffer the same average yearly affect that other companies did over the time period.
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However further isolation of the regulation period is needed to identify whether or not
companies within the IT industry actually observed positive option use.

Model 4
In this final model an additional two interaction terms were added to the
regression in order to observe the change regulation had on the IT industry. The
regression was run as follows:
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 = ∝ + 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙11 + (𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 ∗ 𝑑𝐼𝑇) + (𝑑2006 ∗ 𝑑𝐼𝑇) +
(𝑑2013 ∗ 𝑑𝐼𝑇) + 𝜀𝑗
The Original11 variables did not see any significant changes from the previous model
but the introduction of the two new interaction terms showed much different results from
the results in Model 3. (𝑑2006 ∗ 𝑑𝐼𝑇), although not significant at the 5% level as it was
in Model 2, showed that OptionShare use did not decrease as much as it did for non IT
companies with the introduction for the revised FAS123. A coefficient of -2.184% was
much lighter than the -4.619% in Model 2 which indicates the industry is not as sensitive
to regulation changes as others. When interacting the IT dummy and the year 2013 we
see that there is a 2.181% decrease in OptionShare in the year within IT companies a
much different scenario than Model 2 which indicated there was an increase in option use
among all companies. Finally when observing (𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 ∗ 𝑑𝐼𝑇) we find that there is
little change between this model and the previous. After accounting for the regulation
changes we find that there was a very small yearly change from 0.205% to 0.226% which
is a total of 0.21% over the past decade.
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V. Conclusion
The results of this study indicate three different aspects one old and two new.
First of all the results indicate that there has been a drastic decrease in option use within
all companies following the introduction of FAS123(r) which reinforces previous studies
done on this issue but this study has shown that there is a significant decrease in option
use over the past decade even when accounting for regulation changes and other factors.
Second, we can also observe that the IT industry has not reduced their use of options at
any greater level than the remaining industries, if anything companies within the industry
are less sensitive to the regulation changes over the past decade and have actually
increased option use after factoring in other variables. Finally it seems that the industry
has seen a large decline in option use in 2013 however I do not believe it has to do with
the specific passing of Dodd Frank Section 952. Overall this study has revealed that the
industry is less sensitive to regulation change and that option use is still strong within IT
firms. The IT industry is always on the hunt for innovation and it would be wise that an
industry with high ambitions.
There are copious amounts of areas that could be researched within this topic.
Focus on other industries should reveal how regulation has affected option use and with
the recent financial crisis, studies within the financial sector would be a useful avenue for
future research. Other areas for research would also include lawmaking. Studies of
incentives for option use could provide lawmakers with more guidance on policies that
would target specific industries or control risk-taking.
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Tables
Table 1
The table below summarized the companies that fall within the IT grouping used in this
study. All Industries covered as well as their sub-industries are represented in this table.

S&P Industry
Code
4510

Industry Group
Software & Services

Sub-Industry
Internet Software & Services
IT Consulting & other Services
Data Processing & Outsourced Services
Application Software
Systems Software
Home Entertainment Software

4520

Technology Hardware & Equipment

Communications Equipment
Networking Equipment
Telecommunications Equipment
Computer Hardware
Computer Storage & Peripherals
Electronic Equipment & Instruments
Electronic Components
Electronic Manufacturing Services
Technology Distributors
Office Electronics

4530

Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment

Semiconductor Equipment
Semiconductors

5010

Telecommunication Services

Alternative Carriers
Integrated Telecommunication Services
Wireless Telecommunication Services
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Table 2
Each variable defined in section three of the study and a brief description of each
variable.

Variable
OptionShare
Book-to-Market

Return
LReturn

Dividend Rate
Age
Volatility
Stock Held/Total Pay
Stock Held/Firm Equity
Options Held/Total Pay

Options Held/Firm Equity

Debt to Assets
Market Size

Description
The percentage of total compensation that an executive
receives in the form of a stock option payment
A ratio between the book value of the firm and the market
value of the firm. Calculated by dividing the book value per
share and the market price per share which are both
included in Execucomp data.
The percentage return of a company's share price over the
year
The percentage return of a company's share price over the
year lagged by one year. (The variable Return lagged by
one year)
The amount of dividend paid out per share from the
company
Age of executive in observation
Stock volatility for specific company in an observation
The total amount of stock held by an executive divided by
the total amount of compensation in a given year
The total amount of stock held by an executive divided by
the total equity of the firm in a given year
The total amount of options held (exercisable and
unexercisable) divided by the total amount of compensation
in a given year
The total amount of options held (exercisable and
unexercisable) divided by the total equity of the firm in a
given year
The total debts of a company divided by the total assets of
the company
The total market volume of the company calculated by the
close price times the total shares outstanding
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Table 3
(continued)

Variable

Description

Time Trend

A variable which is dependent on which year an observation
occurs. Each year is assigned a number and (0-21)

d2006
d2013
Time Trend * dIT
d2006 * dIT
d2013 * dIT

A dummy for the year 2006 (year following FAS123(r))
A dummy for the year 2013 (year following Dodd Frank)
Interaction term between Time Trend and IT industry
Interaction term between d2006 and IT industry dummy
Interaction term between d2013 and IT industry dummy
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Table 4
The mean value of salary and options granted compared to the total amount of
compensation executives received in IT industry companies (thousands of dollars).

Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Total

Salary
407.98
421.65
425.99
411.09
412.08
400.82
408.21
409.53
432.53
462.10
462.09
468.69
494.56
525.95
457.17
432.27
460.74
467.60
486.49
503.58
515.17
520.16
555.08
467.94

Options
Granted
918.43
1744.47
1643.83
1988.21
3130.77
4511.44
3585.97
6430.51
10096.80
7100.14
3549.52
2358.13
2838.65
2829.80
1281.23
1203.36
1440.49
1267.64
1235.67
1515.49
1234.06
1615.85
1220.56
2731.33

Total
1881.92
1961.10
2368.04
2593.30
3337.59
4450.08
5349.31
6816.62
10468.55
8215.50
4641.14
3737.15
4133.43
4150.25
3449.04
2770.70
2865.61
2710.55
3314.68
4068.14
3598.66
3865.74
4086.62
4096.08
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Table 5
The mean value of salary and options granted compared to the total amount of
compensation executives received in non-IT industry companies (thousands of dollars).

Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Total

Salary
464.83
479.43
480.06
490.16
502.97
516.99
528.93
548.28
562.23
576.81
584.21
593.60
616.29
645.25
565.17
556.51
579.71
598.32
620.44
631.56
646.50
669.18
703.39
585.08

Options
Granted
441.54
532.02
726.35
641.49
1151.60
1399.09
1757.09
2047.80
2547.00
2305.30
1595.95
1210.79
1364.62
1296.89
805.09
750.84
726.69
607.57
641.38
661.97
573.97
655.88
664.78
1018.62

Total
1662.92
1753.95
1930.79
1988.37
2760.19
3196.11
3521.63
4092.13
4805.29
4478.39
3908.97
3668.54
4156.97
4433.93
3774.97
3494.86
3312.81
3017.66
3603.63
3737.70
3826.02
4256.02
4676.88
3594.53
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Table 6
Summary of the variables defined in section three of the study and compared between
non-IT and IT companies

Option Share
Book-to-Market
Return
Lagged Return
Dividend Rate
Age
Volatility
Stock Held/Total Pay
Stock Held/Firm Equity
Options Held/Total Pay
Options Held/Firm Equity
Debt to Assets
Market Size

It firms
32.75%
0.26
67.85%
47.54%
1.90%
52.08
49.57%
14381%
232%
24.22%
10.93%
61.14%
8432.72

mean
non-it
firms
21.82%
0.22
59.93%
53.14%
2.20%
53.97
40.54%
268%
178%
11.99%
13.15%
43.66%
7597.44

pval
0.000
0.806
0.819
0.850
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.021
0.000
0.000
0.068
0.000
0.002

It firms
24.54%
0.42
3.62%
3.53%
1.50%
52
46.50%
15.29%
4.54%
15.08%
3.36%
39.30%
1130.36

median
non-it
firms
14.46%
0.48
5.95%
6.28%
1.90%
54
37.35%
10.15%
0.51%
4.38%
2.23%
59.47%
1657.14

pval
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
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Table 7
Results of for the following four regressions.

Model 1: 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 = ∝ + 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙11 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝜀𝑗
Model 2: 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 = ∝ + 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙11 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝑑2006 + 𝑑2013 + 𝜀𝑗
Model 3: 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 = ∝ + 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙11 + (𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 ∗ 𝑑𝐼𝑇) + 𝜀𝑗
Model 4: 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 = ∝ + 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙11 + (𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 ∗ 𝑑𝐼𝑇) + (𝑑2006 ∗ 𝑑𝐼𝑇) +
(𝑑2013 ∗ 𝑑𝐼𝑇) + 𝜀𝑗

Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Time Trend

-0.6277
(-7.21)

-0.7937
(-7.72)

d2006

-4.6193
(-3.39)

d2013

0.7448
(1.43)

Time Trend * dIT

Model 3

Model 4

0.2053
(9.24)

0.2255
(9.35)

d2006 * dIT

-2.1837
(-0.73)

d2013 * dIT

-2.1806
(-2.08)
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Table 7
(Continued)

Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Return

-0.0047
(-2.83)

-0.0051
(-3.06)

-0.0039
(-2.4)

-0.0038
(-2.34)

Lagged Return

0.0001
(2.37)

0.0001
(2.38)

0.0001
(2.39)

0.0001
(2.39)

Book-to-Market

-0.0003
(-0.99)

-0.0003
(-1.03)

-0.0001
(-0.51)

-0.0001
(-0.49)

Age

0.0005
(0.02)

0.0043
(0.18)

0.0034
(0.14)

0.0044
(0.18)

Volatility

0.0323
(2.8)

0.0300
(2.6)

0.0205
(1.77)

0.0199
(1.72)

Options Held / Total Pay

0.0162
(3.5)

0.0163
(3.53)

0.0159
(3.45)

0.0160
(3.46)

Options Held / Firm Equity

-0.0010
(-0.16)

-0.0009
(-0.14)

-0.0012
(-0.18)

-0.0013
(-0.19)

Stock Held / Total Pay

0.0061
(3.99)

0.0061
(4.04)

0.0063
(4.13)

0.0063
(4.13)

Stock Held / Firm Equity

0.2774
(3.41)

0.2808
(5.48)

0.3082
(6.05)

0.3086
(6.06)

Market Value

0.0000
(5.89)

0.0000
(5.84)

0.0000
(5.4)

0.0000
(5.41)

Debt to Assets

-0.0648
(-10.4)

-0.0645
(-10.36)

-0.0516
(-8.04)

-0.0513
(-7.99)

41.79206
(17.63)

38.7812
(17.96)

25.6791
(17.29)

25.6230
(17.25)

0.0391
0.0379
9558

0.0404
0.039
9558

0.0425
0.0413
9558

0.0429
0.0415
9558

Constant
R-Squared
Adjusted R-Squared
Observations
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